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Abstract
Background: In obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), individuals feel compelled to repeatedly perform security-related
behaviors, even though these behaviours seem excessive and unwarranted to them. The present research investigated two
alternative ways of explaining such behavior: (1) a dysfunction of activation—a starting problem—in which the level of
excitation in response to stimuli suggesting potential danger is abnormally strong; versus (2) a dysfunction of termination—
a stopping problem—in which the satiety-like process for shutting down security-related thoughts and actions is
abnormally weak.
Method: In two experiments, 70 patients with OCD (57 with washing compulsions, 13 with checking compulsions) and 72
controls were exposed to contamination cues—immersing a hand in wet diapers —and later allowed to wash their hands,
first limited to 30 s and then for as long as desired. The intensity of activation of security motivation was measured
objectively by change in respiratory sinus arrythmia. Subjective ratings (e.g., contamination) and behavioral measures (e.g.,
duration of hand washing) were also collected.
Results: Compared to controls, OCD patients with washing compulsions did not differ significantly in their levels of initial
activation to the threat of contamination; however, they were significantly less able to reduce this activation by engaging in
the corrective behavior of hand-washing. Further, the deactivating effect of hand-washing in OCD patients with checking
compulsions was similar to that for controls, indicating that the dysfunction of termination in OCD is specific to the patient’s
symptom profile.
Conclusions: These results are the first to show that OCD is characterized by a reduced ability of security-related behavior to
terminate motivation evoked by potential danger, rather than a heightened initial sensitivity to potential threat. They lend
support to the security-motivation theory of OCD (Szechtman & Woody, 2004) and have important implications both for
research into the biological mechanisms underlying OCD and for the development of new treatment approaches.
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Introduction
In obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), individuals feel
compelled to perform certain security-related behaviors over and
over again, such as washing their hands or checking that a door is
locked, even though these repetitive behaviours typically seem
excessive and unwarranted to them. Except for their intensity and
persistence, these pathological acts closely resemble normal
security-related behavior [1,2]. Accordingly, Szechtman and
Woody [3] proposed that OCD is a dysfunction of a biologically
primal motivational system that normally helps to protect
organisms from potential dangers like disease and attack by
predators. Cues suggesting potential threat activate this Security
Motivation System (SMS), which motivates preventative behaviors
such as washing and checking, and the performance of these
behaviors in turn typically provides negative feedback to terminate
the security motivation. From this framework, OCD is basically a
disorder in the regulation of a normal motivational system
[4,5,6,7,8,9,10].
There are two different ways to explain the pathological
intensity and persistence of security-related behavior in OCD [11].
One explanation posits that there is a dysfunction of activation—a
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 January 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 1 | e30586starting problem—in which there is pathological intensity of
excitation of the system by stimuli suggesting potential danger.
According to this account, in OCD, threat concerns would be too
readily or too intensely triggered by stimuli [12]. A contrasting
explanation posits that underlying OCD is a dysfunction of
termination—a stopping problem—in which there is failure of
the normal process of termination of such security-related thoughts
and actions. According to this account, in OCD, threat concerns
may be elicited in the normal way, but once these concerns are
activated, security-related behaviors are abnormally ineffective in
turning these concerns off.
Building on the work of Reed [13,14], we argued that
characterizing OCD as a pathology of stopping better captures
the behavioral profile of the disorder [3,4]. When Reed analyzed
the phenomenology of compulsive experiences in OCD, he found
that the most common experience reported was an inability to
stop—for instance, ‘‘I can’t move on because I can’t convince
myself that I’ve finished what I’m doing’’ [14] (p.127). However,
rather than conceptualizing OCD in terms of a general underlying
cognitive disability to achieve closure, as Reed did, we posited that
OCD results from the breakdown of a specific satiety-like
mechanism by which engagement in security-related behavior
normally shuts down the security motivation system. Phenome-
nologically, this stopping mechanism is associated with an
internally generated satiety-like signal that serves as a terminator
for the motivation. In individuals with OCD, performance of
security-related behavior may fail to shut down activation of the
system in the normal way. Such failure would explain why, in
OCD, security motivation persists abnormally long and drives
compulsive and obsessive behaviors.
In summary, OCD can be characterized either as a problem of
starting (hypersensitivity to potential threat stimuli) or as a
problem of stopping (dysfunction of a satiety-like, negative
feedback mechanism). Here we report two experiments that shed
light on these alternative conceptions.
Respiratory Sinus Arrythmia as an Index of the Activation
of Security Motivation
In these experiments, rather than relying only on subjective
report, we employed respiratory sinus arrythmia (RSA) as an
objective measure of the activation of security motivation. The
rationale for using RSA stems from polyvagal theory [15], which
posits a hierarchy of states of parasympathetic-sympathetic
functioning. A state dominated by parasympathetic influence
facilitates social behavior in circumstances that are safe from
danger, whereas a state dominated by sympathetic influence
facilitates fight-or-flight behavior in circumstances that present
imminent danger. According to polyvagal theory, there is an
intermediate state, occurring when attention is drawn to the
environment because of potential threat or novelty, in which
parasympathetic influence is reduced, so that the sympathetic
system can be triggered quickly if it turns out to be required later.
This potential-threat state of autonomic function can be
monitored by its characteristic effect on heart-rate variability.
Heart rate varies in association with spontaneous breathing, and
the degree of this variability, measured as RSA, reflects the
influence of a vagal brake on the cardiac pacemaker, inhibiting the
heart from beating at its intrinsically higher rate [15]. Removal of
this brake makes the heart’s inter-beat interval less modulated and
hence more regular, yielding decreased RSA amplitude (measured
in ln msec
2), which thus indicates a shift from a safe toward a
potential-threat autonomic state. Further, RSA change is a
relatively pure index of vagal brake removal, unlike heart rate
which is also affected by other vagal and sympathetic factors.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 was designed to evaluate the following hypothesis:
The problem in OCD is a reduced ability of security-related
behavior to terminate motivation evoked by potential danger,
rather than a heightened initial sensitivity to potential threat. In
testing this hypothesis, the objectives of the experiment were: (a) to
measure the sensitivity to activation by potential threat; (b) to
measure the effectiveness of security-related behavior in terminat-
ing activation from potential threat; and (c) to determine whether
either or both of those characteristics distinguish OCD patients
from non-patient controls.
The paradigm used in this experiment was developed previously
in a series of studies with non-patient participants [16]. These
studies established that exposure to stimuli implying the threat of
contamination activates security motivation, that this activation
persists for a long time in the absence of corrective behavior, and
that the corrective behavior of hand washing promptly deactivates
the motivation. These studies also established that RSA change
provides a sensitive objective index of the level of activation of
security motivation [4,16].
Methods
Participants. Participants were 57 patients (16 men) and 57
non-patient controls (16 men). The patients were recruited
through the McMaster University Medical Centre (Hamilton
Health Sciences) (33 participants) or advertisements in the general
community (24 participants). All patient participants had a
primary diagnosis of OCD, with washing compulsions as the
predominant symptom. Patients recruited through the clinic were
diagnosed with either the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-
IV (SCID) [17] or the Mini-International Neuropsychiatric
Interview (MINI) [18], and diagnostic status was confirmed by
an experienced clinician (MVA). The Padua-R [19] was used to
evaluate OCD symptom severity: All patients had total scores of at
least 29, contamination subscale scores of at least 14, and a higher
score on the contamination subscale than on the checking
subscale. The non-patient control participants were recruited to
match the age and gender distributions of the patients, but they
reported no known mental disorders. The relative absence of
OCD symptoms was confirmed using the Padua-R: All control
participants had total scores of less than 29 and contamination and
checking subscale scores of less than 14. Further details of the
participants are provided in Table 1.
All participants were prescreened to ensure no known problems
involving heart or lung function and no known allergies.
Participants were asked to refrain from coffee and other stimulants
for at least 2 hours prior to the study. The study was approved by
the McMaster University and Hamilton Health Sciences Institu-
tional Review Board. After a description of the study to the
participants, written informed consent was obtained.
Materials and apparatus. Three levels of stimuli were
designed to differ in the level of implied threat of contamination
via germs or disease. The lowest level of threat was clean
Styrofoam beads; the middle level was clean, dry diapers; and the
highest level was wetted diapers. Previous research has
demonstrated that with non-patient participants, contact with
these stimuli elicit strongly differing levels of objective (RSA) and
subjective response (rating of feelings of contamination), consistent
with the implied level of contamination threat [15,16,20].
Participants were randomly assigned to the experimental
conditions, subject to the constraint of comparable gender
composition across groups.
OCD as a Pathology of Stopping versus Starting
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piled in a hospital wastebin labeled Pediatrics; in the Styrofoam-
beads condition, a similar but unlabeled container was used.
Participants washed their hands at a sink fitted with an automatic,
motion-activated faucet that was preset to deliver a consistent flow
of warm water (at about 25uC).
For the measurement of RSA, the ECG signal was sampled at
2000 Hz and amplified using the Biopac data acquisition system.
For each participant, a data file of interbeat intervals was analyzed
to determine the RSA index of vagal tone, using the software
CardioEdit and CardioBatch, according to the protocol developed
by Porges and colleagues [15,20].
Procedure. The participant remained seated throughout the
experiment and was able to reach the sink at the required times by
simply rotating the chair. The experimenter attached ECG
electrodes and familiarized participants with operation of the
automatic faucet and the procedure for hand washing. Participants
were informed that at some point during the experiment, they
would be asked to contact a stimulus that might or might not be
contaminated. An initial 2-min, eyes-closed resting period allowed
the collection of the baseline RSA. Next, participants made
contact with the stimulus by submerging their left hand and arm
into the bin containing the diapers or Styrofoam beads and
moving their hand through the contents of the bin for 2 min.
Participants were then instructed to remove their hand from the
bin, hold it motionless in their lap (to avoid movement artifacts),
and focus attention on it with eyes closed. At this time, the second
2-min period of RSA data was collected. Next, participants
engaged in a prescribed 30-second period of hand washing.
Specifically, they were told, ‘‘You have 30 seconds to wash, so if
you are still washing after 30 seconds, I will ask you to stop.’’ A
subsequent 2-min resting period with eyes closed allowed the
collection of the third sample of RSA data. Finally, participants
washed their hands freely for as long as they wanted. The
subsequent 2-min resting period with eyes closed allowed the
collection of the final sample of RSA data. At the end of each
resting period, participants were asked to indicate their subjective
level of contamination experienced during the last 2 min by
pointing to the appropriate spot on a 15-cm line with the
endpoints labeled ‘‘not at all contaminated’’ and ‘‘extremely
contaminated.’’ Each response was quantified as the distance in
centimeters from the lower endpoint. In addition, after both the
fixed and free washes, participants likewise made a rating of their
sense of satisfaction from their hand washing. For both the fixed
and free washes, the amount of time in seconds that each
participant actually spent washing was also measured. At the end
of the study, all participants completed the Padua-R.
Results and Discussion
The most important data in this experiment are the RSA values
at three times of measurement: after contact with the stimulus
(diapers or Styrofoam), after the fixed 30-second wash, and after
the subsequent free wash. For each participant, these RSA values
were subtracted from baseline RSA, so that higher scores represent
higher levels of SMS activation.
The RSA change data were submitted to multivariate analysis
of covariance (MANCOVA), with baseline RSA, age, and sex as
covariates. The statistical tests for RSA change using baseline RSA
as a covariate are identical to the corresponding tests for raw RSA
with baseline RSA as a covariate; the advantage of using RSA
change is simply to express decreases in RSA as increases in SMS
activation. Statistical tests were based on Pillai’s trace.
As indicated earlier, all the OCD-patient participants were
actively symptomatic at the time of the study, despite any
medication. Nonetheless, to examine possible effects of medica-
tion, an initial analysis of the OCD patients divided them into
three groups by Medication Type: no medication (12 participants),
antidepressants (32 participants), and clonazepam (9 participants).
For the purpose of this analysis only, 4 OCD patients were
excluded because they were taking a combination of both
antidepressant medication and clonazepam. There were no
significant effects of Medication Type on RSA, either as a main
effect or in interaction with Stimulus (diapers or Styrofoam) and
Time of Measurement. Hence, for subsequent analysis comparing
the OCD patients to non-patient controls, we combined all the
OCD patients (including the 4 patient participants on mixed
medications) into one group.
In the analysis of RSA, there were two statistically significant
interactions with Group (OCD patients vs. controls): the three-way
interaction of Group, Stimulus, and Time of Measurement, F(4,
210)=4.48, p,.01, partial eta-squared=.08; and the two-way
interaction of Group and Time of Measurement, F(2,
104)=23.11, p,.001, partial eta-squared=.31. Figure 1 depicts
the relevant adjusted means. Looking first at the after-contact
time-of-measurement for each of the stimulus conditions, it was
evident that for both the OCD patients and the control
participants, contact with diapers elicited much greater activation
than contact with Styrofoam. However, there was no significant
difference between the OCD patients and the controls in this
initial SMS response. This finding is inconsistent with the
Table 1. Demographic and Clinical Characteristics of Participants in Experiments 1 and 2.
Characteristic Experiment 1 Experiment 2
OCD Patients
a,b Non-Patient Controls OCD Patients
c,d Non-Patient Control
Age (years) 33.9569.38 31.1667.53 29.6266.78 29.8066.38
Total Score on Padua-R 51.4969.60 18.7764.44 52.6366.24 20.4064.36
Contamination subscale, Padua-R 20.1965.79 7.4762.58 9.3862.18 7.4762.64
Checking subscale, Padua-R 9.4963.18 7.2562.71 8.2062.70 24.3863.71
Values are mean6SD.
aComorbid diagnoses: None (70.2%), major depressive disorder (15.8%), generalized anxiety disorder (8.8%), alcohol abuse (7.9%).
bPsychotropic medications: None (21.1%), paroxetine or fluoxetine (35.1%), clonazepam (22.8%), citalopram or escitalopram (14.0%).
cComorbid diagnoses: None (53.8%), major depressive disorder (23.1%), generalized anxiety disorder (23.1%).
dPsychotropic medications: None (15.4%), paroxetine or fluoxetine (38.5%), clonazepam (15.4%), citalopram or escitalopram (15.4%).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030586.t001
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heightened sensitivity to activation by potential threats. Second,
examining the effect of the fixed (30-second) wash in the two
diaper conditions, this limited-time corrective behavior was
significantly less effective in reducing SMS activity for the OCD
patients compared to the controls. This finding supports our
hypothesis that OCD stems from a reduced ability of security-
related behavior to terminate motivation evoked by potential
danger. Interestingly, after the free wash, when all participants had
had the opportunity to wash as long as they wished, the difference
between groups became smaller and not statistically significant, a
result we interpret in the general discussion.
The corresponding MANCOVA on subjective ratings of
contamination yielded a similar, but less striking pattern of results.
The significant effect involving Group was the two-way interaction
of Group and Time of Measurement, F(2, 105)=12.48, p,.001,
partial eta-squared=.19, reflecting the general tendency for
feelings of contamination to drop after washing significantly less
for OCD patients than for control participants. Consistent with
the results for RSA, there were no significant differences between
OCD patients and controls in their feelings of contamination
immediately after contact with either dry or wet diapers; both
groups rated their feeling of contamination similarly high.
The results for actual wash duration and satisfaction clarify the
overall picture. (For both of these outcomes, there were just two
times of measurement: after the fixed wash, and after the free
wash). A MANCOVA of wash duration with age and sex as
covariates yielded two statistically significant interactions with
Group: the three-way interaction of Group, Stimulus, and Time of
Measurement, F(2, 106)=8.34, p,.001, partial eta-squared=.14;
and the two-way interaction of Group and Time of Measurement,
F(1, 106)=37.98, p,.001, partial eta-squared=.26. The corre-
sponding MANCOVA of satisfaction yielded the same two
significant effects: for Group6Simulus6Time, F(2, 106)=3.13,
p,.05, partial eta-squared=.06; and for Group6Time, F(1,
106)=30.01, p,.001, partial eta-squared=.22. Figure 2 shows
the adjusted means for these two variables. After exposure to both
dry and wet diapers, the fixed wash left the OCD patients
significantly less satisfied than the control participants. However,
even though the OCD patients washed much longer than controls
in the subsequent free-wash opportunity, their level of satisfaction
with their hand-washing remained significantly lower than that of
the controls. In short, even with substantially longer washing, the
OCD patients did not achieve the level of satisfaction of the
control participants. Overall, these satisfaction and wash-duration
data, together with the RSA and contamination results, lend
strong support to our hypothesis that OCD reflects a reduced
ability of security-related behavior to terminate motivation evoked
by potential danger, rather than a heightened initial sensitivity to
potential threat.
A limitation of Experiment 1 is that it considered only one
subtype of OCD, namely, washers. Thus, it is not clear whether
the results apply to this subtype only, or would also apply to OCD
patients with a different symptom subtype. Hence, Experiment 2
examines whether similar findings characterize OCD patients with
checking compulsions.
Experiment 2
A major issue in understanding OCD is to explain why it takes
the form of distinct symptom clusters or subtypes that are
reasonably stable over time, such as ‘‘washers’’ and ‘‘checkers’’
[21,22,23]. Why do OCD patients tend to have difficulty with only
a particular domain of security concerns, but not all?
This question can be addressed in terms of the distinction
between starting versus stopping mechanisms raised earlier. One
possible explanation is that OCD patients have a specific starting
problem, but no stopping problem at all, as argued by some
Figure 1. Effect of stimulus contact and subsequent hand washing on RSA in OCD patients with washing compulsions vs. non-
patient controls. To index activation of the security motivation system, RSA change was computed as baseline RSA minus RSA level; thus, increases
in the index correspond to greater activation Fixed wash was limited to 30 s; free wash was as long as the participant wanted. Note: * p,.05 vs.
controls at the same time of measurement. Error bars represent 1 SE.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030586.g001
OCD as a Pathology of Stopping versus Starting
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 4 January 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 1 | e30586investigators [12]. For example, an OCD washer would be
hypersensitive to activation by threats of contamination, but not
other potential threats. Another possible explanation is that all
OCD patients have a general stopping deficit, but the domain in
which they show symptoms is one in which they have high
sensitivity to activation by a particular class of threat stimuli. A
third possibility is that the stopping deficit in each OCD patient
tends to be specific to a particular domain of potential threats. For
example, a patient for whom washing is relatively ineffective in
shutting down activation related to contamination threat may not
have difficulty in terminating activation in response to other types
of potential threats.
The foregoing experiment with OCD washers provided some
evidence against the first two of these alternative possibilities, in
that these patients did not show any indication of a starting
problem in response to the threat of contamination. In addition,
the results of that experiment lent support to the third possibility
by showing a stopping deficit.
However, the design of Experiment 1 did not allow us to
evaluate the specificity of this stopping deficit. In particular, would
OCD patients whose predominant symptom is checking also show
a stopping deficit in response to the symptom-unrelated threat of
contamination? In Experiment 2, we used the basic paradigm of
Experiment 1, with just the strongest of the three stimulus levels of
implied threat (wet diapers), to compare OCD checkers to non-
patient controls. If the stopping deficit in OCD is a general one,
then the OCD checkers should differ from controls in the ways
that OCD washers did in Experiment 1. Alternatively, if the
stopping deficit is specific to the type of threat characteristic of the
patient’s symptoms, then the results for the OCD checkers should
closely resemble those for the non-patient controls.
Methods
Participants. Participants were 13 patients (4 men) and 15
non-patient controls (5 men). As in Experiment 1, the patients
were recruited through the McMaster University Medical Centre,
(Hamilton Health Sciences) (5 participants) or advertisements in
the general community (8 participants). All patient participants
had a primary diagnosis of OCD, with checking compulsions as
the predominant symptom. OCD symptom severity was
confirmed using the Padua-R: All patients had total scores of at
least 39, checking subscale scores of at least 20, and a higher score
on the checking subscale than on the contamination subscale. The
non-patient control participants were recruited to match the age
and gender distributions of the patients, but they reported no
known mental disorders. The relative absence of OCD symptoms
was confirmed using the Padua-R: All control participants had
total scores of less than 29 and contamination and checking
subscale scores of less than 14. Further details of the participants
are provided in Table 1.
All participants were prescreened as in Experiment 1. This
study was approved by the McMaster University and Hamilton
Health Sciences Institutional Review Board.
Materials and apparatus. For all participants in
Experiment 2, the potentially contaminated stimulus was the wet
diapers, as used in Experiment 1. Materials and apparatus were as
described for Experiment 1.
Procedure. RSA and subjective ratings were collected as
described for Experiment 1.
Results and Discussion
As for Experiment 1, the RSA change data were submitted to
multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA), with baseline
RSA, age, and sex as covariates. Because in Experiment 2 there is
just one level of stimulus potential threat, the most important effect
is the two-way interaction of Group with Time of Measurement.
This effect did not approach statistical significance, F(2, 22)=.10,
ns. The leftmost panel of Figure 3 shows the relevant adjusted
means, which are clearly virtually identical for the checking OCD
patients and the non-patient controls.
Figure 2. Effect of hand washing on satisfaction and wash duration in OCD patients with washing compulsions vs. non-patient
controls. Note: * p,.05 vs. controls at the same time of measurement. Error bars represent 1 SE.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030586.g002
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duration, and satisfaction also yielded Group6Time of Measure-
ment interactions that did not approach significance: F(2,
23)=1.13, ns; F(1, 24)=.55, ns; and F(1, 24)=1.63, ns,
respectively. The adjusted means for satisfaction and wash
duration appear in the other two panels of Figure 3. For the
OCD checkers and the non-patient controls in Experiment 2, the
patterns of data closely resemble the patterns shown by the
controls in Experiment 1, rather than the OCD washers in that
experiment.
Thus, the corrective behavior of washing appears to be just as
effective in alleviating SMS activation for OCD checkers as it is for
controls. Taken together with the results of Experiment 1, these
results from Experiment 2 support the hypothesis that the stopping
deficit in OCD is specific to the type of potential threat that is
characteristic of the patient’s symptoms. Further support for this
hypothesis would be provided by a future experiment that uses a
checking paradigm to show that OCD checkers demonstrate a
stopping deficit, but OCD washers do not.
Discussion
The results of these experiments show that OCD reflects
impairment in the ability of security-related behavior to terminate
motivation evoked by potential danger, rather than a heightened
initial sensitivity to potential threat. Our finding that OCD is not
characterized by heightened initial sensitivity to potential threat is
consistent with findings from other studies (e.g., [24,25,26,27]). A
second major finding from the present research is that the stopping
impairment in OCD appears to be specific to the potential threats
involved in the patient’s symptoms, helping to explain why the
disorder takes the form of relatively distinct symptom clusters.
Such symptom specificity is also consistent with the findings of
others (e.g., [28,29]).
Immediate versus Delayed Components to the Stop
Signal
An unanticipated and intriguing finding from Experiment 1
with OCD washers was that after the free wash, when patients had
washed as long as desired, the autonomic index of SMS activity
(RSA change) indicated a deactivation of security motivation
(consistent with their stopping of hand-washing). Yet the OCD
patients reported that they did not feel as satisfied as controls that
they had washed enough, suggesting incomplete deactivation of
security motivation. Of several plausible interpretations for this
finding, a particularly interesting one is a hypothesis that
distinguishes immediate and delayed effects of a stop-signal
deficiency in OCD.
There is much research on motivation to indicate that a ‘‘stop’’ or
‘‘satiety’’ signal that terminates an activated motivation is not an
‘‘all-or-none’’ event, but is rather a series of cascading mechanisms
with distinct time lines. To illustrate, the behavioral act of eating
brings hunger motivation to an end, but the mechanisms that
ultimately arrest further eating and suppress hunger motivation are
complex and distinct. For instance, filling the stomach with food
distends the stomach and such stretching of stomach walls provides
an immediate, albeit relatively short-acting, mechanical signal to
inhibit the continuation of eating. Normally, this signal is of
sufficient duration to allow the appearance of time-delayed signals
as a result of postingestive metabolism of nutrients [30,31,32]. It is
the effects of those metabolic factors on brain circuits that suppress
the re-appearance of hunger motivation for an extended period of
time [33,34,35,36].
In a similar manner, we hypothesize that there are both
immediate and delayed components to the stop signal that
deactivates security motivation. Moreover, we propose that a
deficiency of the delayed components makes OCD patients
particularly susceptible to re-activation by potential threat. To
provide an analogy, gastric loading with water rather than food
can suppress hunger albeit briefly compared to a nutrient meal,
and consequently the motivation to eat will emerge more quickly
due to the absence of delayed metabolic inhibitory factors.
Recall that the OCD washers in our experiment showed a
deficiency in generating the stop signal to deactivate security
motivation, as measured by the inadequacy of the fixed 30-second
hand-wash to restore the RSA change back to baseline. However,
by extending the duration of hand-washing, the stop signal
deficiency was partly ameliorated in a revealing way: Washing as
Figure 3. Effect of hand washing on RSA change, satisfaction, and wash duration in OCD patients with checking compulsions vs.
non-patient controls. Note: Error bars represent 1 SE.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030586.g003
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to baseline but not the subjective satisfaction with washing. Hence,
we suggest,RSA change indexestheimmediate componentof the
stop signal, while subjective satisfaction tracks the delayed or
longer-lasting component of the stop mechanism. In other words,
OCD patients can partially compensate for their deficient ‘stop’
mechanism by increasing the amount of corrective behavior, but
this compensation does not generate the long-term ‘‘satiation’’
signal.
The essential prediction of the model above is that in OCD
patients, the security motivation system, once activated, does not
fully deactivate with corrective behavior, in that the system
becomes sensitized to re-activation by potential threats. Note
that the model predicts enhanced re-activation to potential threat
stimuli, but normal activation upon first exposure (indeed, we
found no initial hypersensitivity in our experiment with OCD
washers).
Possible Neural Mechanisms Underlying a Stopping
Deficit
The present results are consistent with the work of other
researchers investigating the idea that OCD stems from a stopping
deficit of some kind [37,38,39,40,41,42,43,44,45,46,47,48,49].
However, because there are distinct types of ‘‘stopping’’
mechanisms in the literature [50], it is important to highlight that
we theorize OCD pathology stems from one specific stop
mechanism, namely, the negative feedback signal which normally
terminates security motivation [3,4,11]. Importantly, this stop
mechanism is distinctly different from the type of stop mechanisms
proposed by several other investigators as impaired in OCD
[51,52,53,54,55] and impulsivity [54,56,57,58,59,60,61]. Those
authors propose that the pathological impairment is in ‘‘behavioral
inhibition,’’ a form of fronto-executive control over motor
responding. This type of cognitive control mechanism is evaluated
by tests such as stop-signal inhibition task, go/no-go task, delay-aversion/
delay-discounting task, and the 5-choice serial reaction time task, each
paradigm tapping different components of the inhibitory control
process [54,56,62,63,64,65,66]. Crucially, such ‘‘stop’’ tests
examine if a deficit exists in the normal frontal mechanisms that
can interrupt, cancel, or withhold, on-going or intended motor
actions [56,63]. In contrast, our theoretical model of the ‘‘stop’’
signal is aligned more with the motivational construct of ‘‘satiety,’’
and considers how the course of behavior aroused by a particular
motivation comes to its normal end upon attainment of the goal
object.
There are important implications of the present results for
research into the biological mechanisms that underlie OCD. A
consistent finding in brain imaging studies of OCD has been
hyperactivity in the orbitofrontal-basal-ganglia circuit [67,68,69],
suggesting that the OCD symptoms reflect pathology of over-
activation in this network. However, if as indicated by the present
results, OCD is due to a dysfunction of stopping, then the problem
may not be this hyperactivity per se, but instead the dysfunction of
neural pathways elsewhere that fail to turn off this activity. Hence,
it would make sense to search for brain regions of hypoactivity in
OCD, which may reflect dysfunctional negative-feedback, stop-
ping pathways.
The neural origin of these stopping pathways is likely in the
brainstem, as elaborated elsewhere [3,4]. Such a supposition
follows from the fact that the structure of security motivation is
open-ended in that the external environment does not possess
signals of goal-attainment—stimuli indicating that there is no
potential danger. Hence, it is the actual performance of security-
related behavior which signals goal-attainment and generates the
negative feedback for terminating security motivation activity.
These stop feedback pathways are proposed to innervate the
limbic striatum and frontal cortex, and arrest the reverberant
activity in the orbitofrontal-basal-ganglia circuit via serotonergic
neurotransmission [3,4]. Accordingly, possible brain regions of
hypoactivity in OCD are neural sites elaborating proprioceptive
feedback from the performance of species-typical security-related
motor actions.
This emphasis on proprioceptive feedback mechanisms is
consistent with the theory of motor control as active inference
[70]. In this view, motor acts are driven by proprioceptive
prediction errors, which are theorized to be evaluated at a low
level in the motor hierarchy. In OCD, failure of proprioceptive
sensory feedback to fulfill the predicted patterns of sensory signals
could generate a mismatch or error signal, which in turn might
interfere with the stop-feedback function of corrective actions.
Possible Therapeutic Implications
The present results also have important therapeutic implica-
tions. First, although exposure with response prevention (ERP), the
prevailing psychotherapeutic treatment for OCD, is quite
effective, a sizeable proportion of patients do not comply with or
find they cannot tolerate ERP. The perspective advanced here
provides a different way of explaining to patients the underlying
nature of their difficulties, which, by linking OCD to normal
psychology, may connect better with their experiences, thus
providing a more acceptable rationale for treatment and
enhancing persistence with its difficult challenges. In particular,
it may be explained to patients that OCD symptoms occur in
response to cues that activate a normal, biologically primal
motivational system that protects people from potential danger.
However, security-related behaviors that for most people would
readily shut down these primal concerns do not work well in
people with OCD. Thus, OCD patients repeat these behaviors in
an attempt to overcome their weak internal stop signal, which
explains why ‘‘too much is not enough.’’ Leahy [71] has integrated
this kind of explanation successfully into a CBT-based treatment
protocol.
Second, complementing the emphasis in CBT on obsessive
thoughts in OCD, the perspective advanced here highlights the
role of compulsive behavior. Although compulsive responses are
blocked in ERP treatment, recent research indicates that this is not
necessary for treatment success; indeed, the opposite possibility,
response intensification, may be as effective [72]. Thus, manip-
ulation of compulsive behavior patterns and their negative-
feedback function may offer new avenues for treatment. The
basic idea would be to develop techniques to teach, or compensate
for the weakness of, the security-satiety or stop signal. For
example, some work suggests that hypnotic suggestions [73] and
biofeedback [42,43] can either block or attenuate confidence in
internal signals. Hence, it is possible that such techniques can also
be used to intensify or enhance the internal stop signal.
Pharmacological interventions might also be developed for such
enhancement.
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